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ABSTRACT  
This paper develops a formal model that accounts for the net effect of an exchange rate 
devaluation on the long-term balance-of-payments constrained growth rate. Such a model 
investigates how a currency devaluation impacts on the home country non-price 
competitiveness via changes in income distribution and the rate of technological innovation. 
The model is built upon two plausible hypotheses. First, it is assumed that the rate of 
technological innovation is directly related to the income elasticity of demand for exports and 
inversely related to the income elasticity of demand for imports. Second, it is assumed that a 
redistribution of income between labour and capital has an ambiguous direct impact on the 
income elasticities ratio. The model shows that the net impact of a currency devaluation on 
growth can go either way depending on the institutional framework of the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
In the context of the Post-Keynesian growth literature, this paper explores a number of 
transmission channels through which a currency devaluation affects the structure of the 
economy, and hence impacts the long-term growth of output. 
After the Second World War, Keynes strongly advocated for the adoption of fixed 
exchange rates within the rules set forth within the Bretton Woods agreement. In the early 
1950s, the fixed exchange rate regime worked quite well because the United States (US) had 
the largest share of the world’s official gold reserves. However during the 1960s this scenario 
began to change drastically. The low interest rates employed by the US government drained 
their gold reserves, thereby reducing their financial account surplus. The Vietnam War-
related expenditures and US foreign aid to other countries were cited as the main cause of the 
country’s ever-growing fiscal and current account deficits. The US also struggled with a 
sharp increase in the price of some inputs and the oil crisis (Glyn et al, 1990).  
In 1971, the US brought the Bretton Woods system to an end by unilaterally suspending 
the conversibility of the US dollar to gold. At the time, mainstream economists claimed that 
countries would be better off with a floating exchange rate regime. They believed that such a 
regime would correct real exchange rate (RER) misalignments automatically, thereby 
preventing a balance-of-payments (BP) crisis and bringing autonomy back to monetary 
policy. The conventional wisdom argues that in this regime relative prices remain practically 
unchanged due to the so-called neoclassical law of one price. Underlying such an argument is 
a strong belief that free, self-regulating markets, instead of governments, can determine more 
efficiently the equilibrium exchange rate, yielding the best possible result for the economy as 
a whole. Therefore, the floating exchange rate regime should be the best way to avoid a BP 
crisis and promote economic growth. Thus, it is clear that, according to this school of 
thought, the exchange rate adjusts itself endogenously and, consequently, can play no role as 
a macroeconomic policy tool. 
At a theoretical level, the law of one price requires infinite price elasticities of demand for 
exports and imports, and negligible income elasticities of demand for exports and imports. As 
a result, growth cannot be BP constrained.  However, ‘since the onset of floating exchange 
rates in 1972, it is clear from the historical evidence that the massive nominal exchange rate 
movements that have taken place have not rectified balance-of-payments disequilibria’ 
(McCombie and Thirlwall 1999, p. 51). Empirical studies strongly suggest that price 
elasticities are rather low, statistically non-significant or carry unexpected signs, whereas the 
opposite is observed for the income elasticities (Carvalho and Lima 2009; Gouvea and Lima 
 
 
 
 
2013; Léon-Ledesma 2002; Moreno-Brid 1999; Moreno-Brid and Perez 1999; Perraton 2003; 
Razmi 2005; Soukiazis et al, 2013). It is income that adjusts to correct BP misalignments, not 
relative prices. 
Since no country can run an ever-increasing level of overseas debt to GDP ratio, the 
balance-of-payments constrained growth (BPCG) rate is the maximum a country is permitted 
to grow.
1
 Thirlwall (1979) demonstrates that a country’s equilibrium growth rate is 
determined by the growth of world income and the trade income elasticities ratio reflecting 
the non-price competition factors affecting its performance in the international trade, such as 
technological capabilities, tastes, stock of knowledge, and so on. In this context, relative 
prices have been pushed aside from the center of the discussion on growth.
2
 Thirlwall (2011, 
p. 232) states ‘that a once-for-all depreciation (or devaluation) will not put a country on a 
permanently higher growth rate. For this to happen, the depreciation would either have to be 
continuous, or affect the parameters of the model favourably’. However, Thirlwall’s (1979) 
standard growth model assumes income elasticities to be exogenous and the growth of 
relative prices is mitigated over time, and hence the RER plays no role in determining the 
long-term growth rate. 
Nonetheless, even though a very weak, or no, relationship is found between relative prices 
and the volume of exports and imports in the trade demand functions, a statistically 
significant connexion between a devalued currency and higher growth rates has been 
observed in the literature. There is a vast range of empirical evidence demonstrating a 
meaningful connection between exchange rate volatility and a poor growth performance for 
several countries since the adoption of the floating exchange rate regime in the 1970s 
(Aguirre and Calderón, 2005; Dollar 1992; Razin and Collins 1997;). The literature also 
shows that countries that sustained their currency at competitive levels over relatively long 
periods experienced, by and large, higher growth rates (Aguirre and Calderón 2005; Dollar 
1992; Gala 2007; Loayza et al, 2004; Rodrik, 2007; Sachs 1985). In light of Thirlwall’s 
growth model, these results indicate that the level of the RER may have some impact on a 
country’s income elasticities.  
                                                          
1
 Setterfield (2006) and McCombie (2011) convincely argue that the supply side, given by the growth 
of the productive potential, adjusts to the  balance-of-payments constrained growth rate. 
2
 An exception to this is Porcile and Lima (2010). They proposed a model where the RER actually 
plays an important role in a balance-of-payments constrained growth model. In their model the level 
of employment and the elasticity of labor supply can prevent currency appreciation, thereby impacting 
directly on income distribution and growth in developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
In this spirit, a more recent literature on BPCG models explores the links between a 
competitive currency and non-price competition factors. Barbosa-Filho (2006) says that a 
devalued RER over a prolonged period of time favors the relative prices of tradable goods, 
hence promoting a structural change in the economy, since technological progress and 
productivity are usually higher in these sectors. In considering Thirlwall’s (multi-sectoral) 
Law, Araújo (2012) discusses how a currency appreciation affects a country’s equilibrium 
growth rate. He shows that the country might lose its comparative advantage in a sector due 
to currency appreciation, and hence damage its capacity to export. As a result, the country 
undergoes an unfavorable structural change slowing down its equilibrium growth rate. Ferrari 
et al (2013) assume a two-sector economy producing only high- and low-technology 
tradables, and suggest that currency devaluation increases the high-technology tradables 
share of total exports and decreases the high-technology tradables share of total imports, thus 
raising the country’s elasticities ratio. Missio and Jayme Jr (2012) claim that a currency 
devaluation, by increasing the profit share to the detriment of real wages, accelerates 
technological progress, improves the competitiveness of exports, and modifies the country’s 
specialization pattern through changes in the income elasticities of demand for exports and 
imports ratio, therefore boosting long-term growth. 
However, the literature has ignored how changes in income distribution may impact on 
consumption patterns, the production decisions of domestic firms, and the non-price 
competitiveness of a country. Assuming that consumers tend to change their preferences 
towards more luxury than necessity goods as their income grows, an increase in the wage 
share of income at the expense of the profit share induces changes in average consumer 
preferences, hence affecting qualitatively a country’s imports.3 Moreover, changes in income 
inequality might also encourage domestic firms to specialize in the production of labor- or 
capital-intensive goods, depending on the source driving the redistribution of income. Here, 
we consider the hypothesis that the RER affects not only a country’s technological progress, 
but also its income distribution, thus changing its non-price competitiveness and, 
consequently, its long-term growth rate. Therefore, we set out a more general theoretical 
framework that enables us to assess the conditions under which a currency devaluation might 
                                                          
3
 The economic literature indicates that all goods can be classified according to their income elasticity 
of demand, as follows: 
- inferior goods: negative income elasticity; 
- necessity goods: income elasticity between 0 and 1; and 
- luxury (or superior) goods: income elasticity greater than 1. 
In this we do not consider the existence of inferior goods, as the income elasticities are strictly 
positive. 
 
 
 
 
either boost or harm long-term growth. Such a model seeks to demonstrate that the impacts of 
a currency devaluation on the growth performance of the economy depends greatly on the 
institutional framework of the economy and hence there is no practical guide or one-size-fits-
all policy recommendation regarding the effects of a currency devaluation on growth. Instead, 
our model suggests that policy makers should carefully evaluate the idiosyncrasies of each 
economy in order to obtain a better diagnosis concerning the effectiveness of an eventual 
currency devaluation policy, since such a policy, if not applied correctly, may have unwanted 
effects. 
 
2. The model 
Let us assume that the global economy consists of two different countries: a rich foreign 
country and a poor home country. The foreign country is an economy that issues the 
international currency and the home country is an economy facing a BP constraint. For 
convenience, there are no international capital flows between the two countries and no 
government activities.
4
 The foreign country is a two-sector economy which produces and 
exports consumption goods and industrial intermediate inputs. The home country is a one-
sector economy that produces and exports only one sort of consumption good and there is 
imperfect substitutability between the foreign and domestic consumption goods. It is also 
assumed that the home country imports consumption goods and industrial intermediate inputs 
from the foreign country. That is to say, the home country imports are disaggregated in two 
different categories, namely, imported consumption good (𝑀𝑐) and imported intermediate 
goods (𝑀𝑟), that is, 𝑀 = 𝑀𝑐 + 𝑀𝑟. By doing so, we have now an extended BP identity: 
𝑃𝑑𝑋 = 𝐸(𝑃𝑓𝑀
𝑐 + 𝑃𝑓
𝑟𝑀𝑟)                                                                                                               (1) 
where 𝑋 is the quantity of exports, 𝑃𝑑 is the domestic price, 𝑃𝑓 is the imported consumption 
goods price in foreign currency,𝑃𝑓
𝑟 is the imported intermediate goods prices in foreign 
currency, and 𝐸 is the nominal exchange rate (that is, the home price of the foreign currency). 
Hereafter, let us assume 𝑃𝑓 = 𝑃𝑓
𝑟 over time. In the rates of change: 
                                                          
4
 McCombie and Thirlwall (1997) and Moreno-Brid (1998) estimate the impact of financial inflows 
on the equilibrium BPCG rate.; Thirlwall (2011) points out that even large flows of capital make little 
quantitative difference to the predictions of the equilibrium BPCG rate. We also assume no 
government activities in order to keep both focus and the model tractable. For details on the 
importance of internal imbalances and fiscal debt on BPCG models see, for example, Soukiazis et al 
(2013, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑥 = 𝑒 + 𝑝𝑓 + 𝜙𝑐𝑚
𝑐 + (1 − 𝜙𝑐)𝑚
𝑟                                                                                    (2) 
where 𝜙𝑐 = 𝑀
𝑐 𝑀⁄ ; (1 − 𝜙𝑐) = 𝑀
𝑟 𝑀⁄ . 
The export demand function is: 
𝑋 = (
𝑃𝑑
𝑃𝑓𝐸
)
𝜂
𝑍𝜀              𝜂 < 0, 𝜀  > 0                                                                                           (3) 
where 𝑍 is the level of the foreign income, 𝜂 is the price elasticity of demand for exports, and 
𝜀 is the income elasticity of demand for exports. In the rates of change: 
𝑥 = 𝜂(𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒) + 𝜀𝑧                                                                                                               (4) 
The import demand functions are: 
𝑀𝑐 = 𝑀0
𝑐 (
𝐸𝑃𝑓
𝑃𝑑
)
𝜓
𝑌𝜋𝑐             𝜓 < 0, 𝜋𝑐 > 1                                                                                (5) 
𝑀𝑟 = 𝜇𝑌                                                                                                                                             (6) 
where 𝑀0
𝑐 and 𝜇 are constants, 𝜓 is the price elasticity of demand for imports, and 𝜋𝑐 is the 
income elasticity of demand for imported consumption goods. Equation (5) is a stable 
multiplicative demand function for imported consumption goods, whereas Equation (6) 
expresses a linear relationship (one can view it as a linear approximation to a long term 
multiplicative function at a specific point in time). It will be assumed here that technological 
innovations are neutral with respect to the amount of intermediate inputs utilized in the 
production process, and hence the ratio of imported intermediate goods to domestic output 
(𝑀𝑟 𝑌⁄ ) does not change over time. In this scenario, it is reasonable to assume the coefficient 
𝜇 is constant.  
 In the rates of change, Equations (5) and (6) respectively are given by: 
𝑚𝑐 = 𝜓(𝑒 + 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝𝑑) + 𝜋𝑐𝑦                                                                                                        (7) 
𝑚𝑟 = 𝑦                                                                                                                                                (8) 
If we allow equations (8), (7) and (4) into (2), we find the growth rate of the revisited model: 
𝑦 =
𝜀𝑧 + (1 + 𝜂 + 𝜙𝑐𝜓)(𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒)
𝜋
                                                                                     (9) 
 
 
 
 
where 𝜋 = 𝜙𝑐(𝜋𝑐) + (1 − 𝜙𝑐) and (1 + 𝜂 + 𝜙𝑐𝜓) < 0 is the extended Marshall-Lerner 
condition which guarantees that a RER devaluation spurs growth in the short term. Assuming 
that relative prices do not change in the long term, (𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒) = 0, we can derive the 
equilibrium BPCG rate from Equation (9): 
𝑦𝐵𝑃 =
𝜀𝑧
𝜋
                                                                                                                                          (10) 
Equation (10) describes the widely known Thirlwall’s Law. This Law states that domestic 
growth is directly related to the growth rate of foreign demand. It also states that the growth 
rate of a country’s output depends positively on its existing non-price competition factors, 
here expressed by the ratio 𝜀 𝜋⁄ . This ratio reflects disparities between countries with respect 
to factors determining the demand for a country’s exports and imports, such as technological 
capabilities, product quality, stock of knowledge, and consumer preferences, for instance. 
Before we continue, it is worth noting that the income elasticity of demand for total imports 
(𝜋) is given by the weighted average of income elasticities of demand for imported 
consumption goods (𝜋𝑐) and imported intermediate inputs, which is equal to unity. In this 
model it is assumed that the impact of changes in the RER and on the weight 𝜙𝑐 is negligible.  
 
2.1 Endogenising income elasticities  
In this analysis, we investigate the net effect of a currency devaluation on the home country’s 
non-price competitiveness via changes in the technology gap and income distribution.  
To commence we assume that there are technological disparities between the foreign and 
home countries. The foreign country pushes forward the technological frontier while the 
home country is lagging behind. Therefore, the inverse of the technology gap between 
foreign and home countries (𝑆) can be proxied by: 
𝑆 =
𝑆𝑑
𝑆𝑓
,       𝑆 ∈ (0,1)                                                                                                                     (11) 
where 𝑆𝑑 and 𝑆𝑓 denote the level of technological capabilities of the home and the foreign 
countries respectively. The level of technological capabilities denote the stock of knowledge 
of the economy. The higher the economy’s stock of knowledge the greater is its ability to 
create technological innovations and hence to raise the productivity of labor. It should be 
noted that in our model only the level of foreign technological capabilities is exogenous. 
 
 
 
 
It is also assumed that there are two classes in the domestic economy, capitalists and 
workers. Following the tradition of Marx and Kalecki (1971), we assume that workers earn 
only wages and spend all their income on consumption, whereas capitalists earn profits and 
consume only part of their income, thus implying that the savings of the economy depends on 
capitalists’ retained profits. Since in most developing countries the savings propensities of the 
workers, excluding CEOs, is very small, the division in the Kaleckian growth model between 
the shares held by profits and wages still holds. 
In an economy that allows for imported intermediate inputs into the unit production cost, 
the wage share of income can be defined as follows: 
𝜎𝐿 =
𝑊
𝑃𝑑
1
𝑎
= 1 − 𝜎𝐾 − (
𝐸𝑃𝑓
𝑃𝑑
𝜇) = 1 − 𝜎𝐾 − Θ𝜇                                                                     (12) 
where 𝜎𝐿 and 𝜎𝐾 are the share of wages and profits in income respectively, Θ = 𝐸𝑃𝑓 𝑃𝑑⁄  is 
the RER, 𝑊 is the average nominal wage and 𝑎 is the labor productivity. Once we know the 
wage share (𝜎𝐿) and the intermediate inputs share (Θ𝜇), the profit share (𝜎𝐾) is determined 
as a residual (a residual in the sense that domestic firms are price-takers and have no control 
over the imported intermediate goods share or over the wage share which is determined in the 
labor market). Now we must address two key hypotheses of the model concerning the impact 
of technological change and income distribution on a country’s non-price competitiveness. 
The first assumption is that an increase in the home country’s relative technological 
capabilities improves its non-price competitiveness (that is 𝑆 →↑ 𝜀 𝜋⁄ ). The higher the level 
of technological capabilities of the economy the higher the capacity of domestic firms to 
distinguish their products and make them more attractive relative to the products produced in 
other countries with a lower stock of knowledge. Hence, an increased level of technological 
capabilities also raises the quality of the products produced domestically.  
Since the quality and attractiveness of domestic goods is proxied by the trade elasticities 
ratio we have 𝑆 and the trade elasticities ratio 𝜀 𝜋⁄  are positively related. This hypothesis is 
strongly supported by the literature at theoretical and empirical levels. Fagerberg (1988) 
questions the traditional wisdom by suggesting that technology and the ability to compete on 
delivery are the main factors affecting differences in international competitiveness, rather 
than relative unit labor costs reflecting differences in price-competitiveness. He also finds 
evidence for 15 industrial countries during the period 1960-83 supporting his arguments. 
Amable and Verspagen (1995) find strong empirical evidence of the positive impact of 
technological progress on the exports-market shares for 5 industrialized countries and 18 
 
 
 
 
industries over the period 1970-91. Hughes (1986) hypothesizes that there is a two-way 
relationship between exports and innovation due to differences in the specificities of demand 
between export and domestic markets in a study for 46 UK manufacturing industries. Léon-
Ledesma (2002) extends the Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) model and find a positive and 
statistically significant impact of technological innovations on exports and labor productivity 
growth for 17 OECD countries from 1965-94. Araujo and Lima (2007) developed a 
disaggregated multi-sectoral version of Thirlwall’s Law, where a country can reach higher 
growth rates only by specializing in sectors with relatively high (low) income elasticities of 
demand for exports (imports). Gouvea and Lima (2010, 2013) test the multi-sectoral model 
and their results, in general, support the hypothesis that goods from relatively high 
technology-intensive sectors have higher (lower) income elasticities of demand for exports 
(imports). 
Another key assumption is that changes in income distribution affect the consumption 
pattern and, consequently, a country’s non-price competitiveness (that is 𝜎𝐿 →↑↓ 𝜀 𝜋⁄ ). From 
a historical perspective, Linder observed in 1961 that international trade in manufactured 
goods amongst developed countries was heavily determined by within-country income levels 
and income distribution (Francois and Kaplan 1996). He postulated that, given the existence 
of non-homothetic preferences, the more unequal the personal income distribution of a 
country, the greater its expenditures on luxury goods (Francois and Kaplan 1996).
 5
 Some 
Latin American Structuralists argue that the high levels of income inequality observed in the 
region led to stark differences in the patterns of consumptions between the lower and the 
upper classes. As the latter used to imitate the pattern of consumption of European developed 
countries, a meaningful part of domestic savings leaked out of those countries to sustain the 
imports of superfluous and highly technological products from developed countries (Furtado 
1968, 1969; Tavares and Serra 1976). A more recent literature emphasizes the impact of an 
increasing income inequality on foreign trade (Bohman and Nilsson 2007; Dalgin et al 2008; 
Mitra and Trindade 2005). They conclude that, given the non-homothetic preferences, more 
unequal countries tend to export relatively more necessity goods and import more luxury 
goods. Changes in income distribution reshape patterns of consumption and foreign trade.  
                                                          
5
 In 1857 the statistician Ernst Engel presented his seminal theory on consumer behavior. He states 
that as income grows consumers tend to substitute luxury for necessity goods, where luxury goods 
have an income elasticity of demand greater than unity and necessity goods have an income elasticity 
of demand less than unity. Here non-homothetic preferences basically mean that the proportion of 
income that consumers spend on luxury and necessity goods varies as income increases.   
 
 
 
 
It is notable that a changing consumption pattern may have inter- and intra-sectoral effects 
on the composition of the consumption goods imported and exported by the home country. 
The inter-sectoral effect accounts for the substitution of necessity for luxury goods—or vice-
versa (after a redistribution of income). Such an effect can be addressed by a multi-sectoral 
Thirlwall’s Law, as developed by Araújo and Lima (2007). However, since we are assuming 
that the home country exports and imports only one type of consumption good with imperfect 
substitutability between them, we do not consider the inter-sectoral effect. Here we assume 
only the intra-sectoral effect, which implies that changes in the income distribution encourage 
foreign and domestic firms to modify the quality and design of their products. Such changes 
in the non-price competitiveness of foreign and domestic goods, due to the income 
redistribution, will cause changes in the income elasticities ratio. 
Changes in the consumption pattern due to the redistribution of income affect separately 
the income elasticity of demand for imports and the income elasticity of demand for exports. 
That said, let us discuss first the intra-sectoral effect on a home country’s imports, that is, the 
impact of income distribution on the income elasticity of demand for imports. It is assumed 
that an increased wage share reduces the capitalist’s desire or predisposition to buy luxury 
goods (and increases their desire for necessity goods) as it increases a worker’s desire for 
luxury goods (at the expense of their desire for necessity goods). Therefore, we have two 
different scenarios: (i) if the reduction in the capitalist’s desire for luxury goods caused by an 
increased wage share over-compensates the increase in a worker’s desire for luxury goods, 
then a higher wage share reduces the aggregate consumers desire for luxury goods in the 
home country; (ii) if an increase in a worker’s desire for luxury goods outweighs the decrease 
in the capitalist’s desire for luxury goods, then an increased wage share increases the 
aggregate consumers desire for luxury goods in the home country.  
However, a simple change in the consumer’s desire or predisposition towards luxury 
goods vis-à-vis necessity goods does not have any actual impact on the income elasticity of 
the demand for imports. The elasticity will change only if the foreign developed economy 
also has the capacity of constantly transforming the quality of its exports and its productive 
structure in order to match the changing consumer demand in its markets (Setterfield 1997). 
In other words, a change in the home country’s income elasticity of imports is caused by an 
intra-sectoral transformation in its imported consumption goods undertaken by foreign firms 
in their pursuit for a higher market share. That said, in scenario (i) in which the aggregate 
consumers desire for luxury goods in the home country is reduced due to a rising wage share, 
the foreign country will meet the requirement of its market by simplifying the quality and 
 
 
 
 
design of its exports, thus lowering the home country’s income elasticity of demand for 
imports. In scenario (ii) where an increased wage share increases the aggregate consumers 
desire for luxury goods in the home country, the foreign economy will be able to improve the 
non-price competitiveness of its exports and hence increase the home country’s income 
elasticity of demand for imports. In short, the impact of a changing consumption pattern on 
the income elasticity of imports is ambiguous. 
As for the intra-sectoral impact on the home country’s exports, that is, the relationship 
between income distribution and income elasticity of exports, the effect is also ambiguous. 
Lower real wages can reduce the wage share and encourage domestic firms to specialize in 
the production of labor-intensive goods, which traditionally tend to have a lower income 
elasticity of demand. However, if a decrease in the wage share is caused by an increase in 
labor productivity, then domestic firms might specialize in more capital-intensive goods, 
which tend to have a higher income elasticity of demand. It is worth noting that the demand 
structure of the foreign country does not affect the home country’s income elasticity of 
exports. Since it is assumed that the home country produces and exports only one sort of 
consumption good, a worsened income distribution impacts negatively on the income 
elasticity of exports, independently of the demand structure of the foreign country. To sum 
up, the impact of a change in the income distribution also has an ambiguous effect on the 
home country’s income elasticity of exports. 
 As a result of these hypotheses, it can be said that trade elasticities are a function of the 
consumption pattern of households (𝐶) and the inverse of the technological gap between the 
foreign and home countries (𝑆), that is, 𝜀 𝜋⁄ = 𝜀 𝜋⁄ (𝐶, 𝑆), where (𝜀 𝜋⁄ )𝐶 ≷ 0 and (𝜀 𝜋⁄ )𝑆 >
0. Moreover, the consumption pattern is a positive function of the wage share, 𝐶 = 𝐶(𝜎𝐿), 
where 𝐶𝜎𝐿 > 0, as it is assumed that a worker’s propensity to consume is higher than the 
capitalist’s propensity to consume. Thus, we can redefine the trade elasticities as 𝜀 𝜋⁄ =
𝜀 𝜋⁄ (𝜎𝐿 , 𝑆), where (𝜀 𝜋⁄ )𝜎𝐿 ≷ 0 and (𝜀 𝜋⁄ )𝑆 > 0. Ergo, for simplicity, the country’s 
elasticity ratio can be described as a linear function of the wage share of its workers in 
income and its relative technological capabilities, as follows: 
𝜀
𝜋
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜎𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑆                                                                                                                    (13) 
Here it will be assumed without loss of generality that 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2 > 0. 𝛽0 > 0 is 
sufficiently high in absolute value in order to rule out the possibility of a negative elasticity 
ratio. Even though the sign of 𝛽1 is ambiguous, here it is assumed that 𝛽1 > 0, which means 
 
 
 
 
that any negative effect of a possible increase in a country’s total consumer demand for 
luxury goods on the income elasticity of imports, caused by an increased wage share, is not 
enough to mitigate the positive impact of a more even distribution of income on the income 
elasticity of exports; and 𝛽2 > 0 falls in line with the hypothesis that a country’s relatively 
high technological capabilities impact positively on its non-price competitiveness. Last, note 
that Equation (13) depends on the existence of the demand function for imported 
consumption goods given by Equation (5). If, for instance, we assume that the home country 
only imports imported intermediate inputs, then the income elasticity of demand  for imports 
remains constant and equal to unity 𝜋 = 1. In this case, several transmission channels, 
specified above through which the RER affects long-term growth, would be nullified. 
However, in order to analyze the net effect of the RER on the elasticities ratio and 
consequently on the long-term growth rate, we must describe how technological innovation 
and income distribution interact over time and also the role of the RER in such a dynamic.  
 
2.2 Technological progress  
Let us assume that the rate of change of technological progress can be expressed as:  
?̇? = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜎𝐾 − 𝛼2𝜎𝐾
2 − 𝛼3𝑆                                                                                                    (14) 
where ?̇? is the derivative of 𝑆 with respect o time, and 𝛼0 ≶ 0 and 𝛼1, 𝛼0, 𝛼3 > 0 are 
parameters. There are two classes in the economy, workers and capitalists. Workers earn only 
wages and consume all their income. Capitalists earn the profits of enterprises and save a 
constant fraction of their income. Following Lima (2004), we assume a non-linear 
relationship between the profit share and technological progress. Since there is no financial 
market in the model, investments in technology are funded from the profit share. At low 
levels of profit rate the capitalists have incentives to invest in technology but run into a 
saving shortage to do so. As the profit share in income increases the capitalists raise their 
capacity to innovate and the technology gap reduces until the point where higher profit rates 
become ineffective to boost technological progress. At the high levels of profit share of 
income, the capitalists lack the incentives to introduce new technologies. We also assume that 
the rate of change of technical progress is a negative function of the inverted technology gap. 
‘This happens because the higher the technology gap, the higher the opportunities for 
learning related to imitation, international technological spillovers and catching up’ (Cimoli 
and Porcile 2014, p. 217). 
 
 
 
 
Substituting 𝜎𝐾 with its very definition (1 − 𝜎𝐿 − Θ𝜇) in (14) and assuming 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 for 
convenience, we have after some rearrangements: 
?̇? = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝜎𝐿 − 𝛼2𝜎𝐿
2 − 𝛼3𝑆                                                                                                     (15) 
where 𝜌0 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼2(1 − Θ𝜇)Θ𝜇 and 𝜌1 = 𝛼2(1 − Θ𝜇). We also assume henceforth 𝜌0 < 0 
without loss of generality, which means 𝛼0 is negative and sufficiently large in absolute 
value. By considering 𝛼0 < 0, we assume the autonomous technological progress in the 
foreign country grows faster than in the home country. 
 The locus ?̇? = 0 describes the relation between technological progress and the wage share, 
provided there is a constant technology gap over time. This equation is given by:  
𝑆 =
𝜌0
𝛼3
+
𝜌1
𝛼3
𝜎𝐿 −
𝛼2
𝛼3
𝜎𝐿
2                                                                                                                (16) 
Accordingly, we can picture an inverted U-shaped curve relating the wage share and 
technological progress. Taking the first derivative we obtain the point of maximum: 
𝜎𝐿
∗ =
𝜌1
2𝛼2
=
1 − Θ𝜇
2
                                                                                                                      (17) 
since Θ𝜇 ∈ (0,1), then 𝜎𝐿
∗ ∈ (0,1/2). Once the second derivative is negative, −2 𝛼2 𝛼3⁄ < 0, 
then 𝜎𝐿
∗ is a point of maximum. Assuming Equation (15) has two distinct real roots, equation 
(16) can be illustrated as in Figure 1.  
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2.3 Functional income distribution 
Let us assume that the time derivative of the wage share of income is a positive function of 
the gap between the wage share expected by workers (𝜎𝐿
𝑒) and the current wage share, as 
follows: 
?̇?𝐿 = 𝜃(𝜎𝐿
𝑒 − 𝜎𝐿)                                                                                                                             (18) 
where 𝜃 > 0 is an adjustment parameter. Now, we must endogenise 𝜎𝐿
𝑒. To do so, let us 
redefine first 𝜎𝐿
𝑒, as follows:  
𝜎𝐿
𝑒 = 1 − 𝜎𝐾
𝑒 − Θ𝜇                                                                                                                         (19) 
 
 
 
 
where 𝜎𝐾
𝑒 is the residual expected profit share with respect to the wage share expected by the 
workers (𝜎𝐿
𝑒) which, in turn, depends on the bargaining power of workers. Once Θ𝜇 is 
constant at first and exogenously given, that is, neither workers nor capitalists have any 
influence on the imported intermediate inputs share of variable unit costs of production, then 
we can say 𝜎𝐿
𝑒 and 𝜎𝐾
𝑒 are inversely related. 
  If 𝜎𝐿
𝑒 depends positively on the bargaining power of workers, then 𝜎𝐾
𝑒, on the other hand, 
is negatively related to the bargaining power of workers: 
𝜎𝐾
𝑒 = 𝜔0 − 𝜔1(𝑙 − 𝑛)                                                                                                                    (20) 
where 𝑙 is the rate of change of employment, 𝑛 is the exogenously given growth of the labor 
force and 𝜔0, 𝜔1 ≥ 0 are parameters. The underlying assumption in Equation (20) is that the 
higher the growth of the employment rate, the higher the bargaining power of workers. 
Plugging equations (20) and (19) into (18) we have: 
?̇?𝐿 = 𝜃[1 − 𝜔0 + 𝜔1(𝑙 − 𝑛) − Θ𝜇 − 𝜎𝐿]                                                                                  (21) 
From the definition of the long-term rate of change of labor productivity, we have the 
following identity: 
𝑙 = 𝑦𝐵𝑃 − ?̂?                                                                                                                                      (22) 
where ?̂? is the growth rate of labor productivity. Following Kaldor (1966), we contend that 
the growth of labor productivity is positively related to the growth of output (the so-called 
Verdoorn’s Law). Drawing upon the formalization of Kaldor’s theory proposed by Dixon and 
Thirlwall (1975), we have the following equation in the long term: 
 ?̂? = 𝑎0 + 𝜆𝑦𝐵𝑃                                                                                                                                (23) 
where 𝑎0 is rate of autonomous productivity growth, and 𝜆 > 0 is the Verdoorn coefficient. 
If we substitute Equations (23), (22), and (13) into Equation (21), we obtain: 
?̇?𝐿 = 𝜃{1 − 𝜔0 + 𝜔1[(1 − 𝜆)(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜎𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑆)𝑧 − 𝑎0 − 𝑛] − Θ𝜇 − 𝜎𝐿}                     (24) 
From Equation (24), in the long-term we expect the real wage and labor productivity will 
grow at the same rate. Note in Equation (24) that the Verdoorn coefficient can be set to zero 
without loss of generality. However, a Verdoorn coefficient equal to zero over-estimates the 
equilibrium value of the wage share, hence affecting the level of relative technological 
 
 
 
 
capabilities and the equilibrium growth rate. Therefore, it is important to include the 
Verdoorn coefficient within our theoretical framework, as future works testing the theoretical 
model should take into account the Verdoorn effect in order to obtain more accurate results. 
Therefore, in the locus ?̇?𝐿 = 0, the equation that describes the relationship between 
technology gap and wage share is given by:  
𝑆 =
𝛾0
𝛾2
+
𝛾1
𝛾2
𝜎𝐿                                                                                                                                 (25) 
where 𝛾0 = Θ𝜇 − 1 + 𝜔0 − 𝜔1[(1 − 𝜆)𝛽0𝑧 − 𝑎0 − 𝑛] ≷ 0, 𝛾1 = 1 − 𝜔1(1 − 𝜆)𝛽1𝑧 ≷ 0, 
𝛾2 = 𝜔1(1 − 𝜆)𝛽2𝑧 > 0. Here we assume 𝛾0 > 0 without loss of generality. It is also 
assumed 𝛾1 > 0 which means 𝑧 < 1 𝜔1(1 − 𝜆)𝛽2⁄  is the condition to be fulfilled. Therefore, 
given these constraints on the parameters, we make sure that the Equation (25) falls within a 
meaningful economic domain, as represented in Figure 2. 
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2.4 The technology gap and income distribution dynamics  
Figure 3 illustrates the non-trivial solutions for the system determined by Equations (16) and 
(25).  
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Now we must analyze the local stability conditions around the equilibrium points 𝐸1 and 𝐸2. 
From Equations (15) and (24) we form a 2x2 non-linear dynamical system for the technology 
gap and income distribution. The linear version of the system is formed by the terms of the 
Jacobian matrix (see Appendix): 
[
𝑑?̇? 𝑑𝑡⁄
𝑑?̇?𝐿 𝑑𝑡⁄
] = [
−𝛼3 2𝛼2(𝜎𝐿
∗ − 𝜎𝐿𝐸𝑖)
𝜃𝛾2 −𝜃𝛾1
] [
𝑆 − 𝑆𝐸𝑖
𝜎𝐿 − 𝜎𝐿𝐸𝑖
]                                                                  (26) 
where 𝑆𝐸𝑖 and 𝜎𝐿𝐸𝑖, for 𝑖 = {1,2}, stand for the generic equilibrium values of 𝑆 and 𝜎𝐿, 
respectively. Before we start the stability analysis, let us follow Lima (2004) and divide the 
domain into the low wage share (LWS) and the high wage share (HWS) regions. The LWS 
region 𝜎𝐿𝐸 < 𝜎𝐿
∗ means the innovation process is wage-led, since 𝜕?̇? 𝜕𝜎𝐿⁄ = 2𝛼2(𝜎𝐿
∗ −
𝜎𝐿𝐸) > 0, whereas in the HWS region 𝜎𝐿
∗ < 𝜎𝐿𝐸, and the technological progress, becomes 
 
 
 
 
profit-led, for 𝜕?̇? 𝜕𝜎𝐿⁄ < 0. As we can see in Figure 3, 𝐸1 is placed within the LWS region, 
whereas 𝐸2 is in the HWS region.   
First, we will analyze the stability conditions around the point 𝐸1 in the LWS region. For 
the point 𝐸1 in the LWS region, the trace of the Jacobian matrix is negative (−𝛼3 − 𝜃𝛾1 <
0) and the determinant is ambiguous [𝛼3𝜃𝛾1 − 𝜃𝛾22𝛼2(𝜎𝐿
∗ − 𝜎𝐿𝐸1) ≶ 0], given 𝜎𝐿
∗ > 𝜎𝐿𝐸1. If 
the determinant is negative, then 𝐸1 is a saddle-point; otherwise, it is a stable point. Here, it 
is assumed, without loss of generality, that the determinant is negative and 𝐸1 is a saddle-
point.  
The same analysis can be extended to the point 𝐸2 in the HWS region. Since the trace of 
the Jacobian matrix in 𝐸2 is also negative and given 𝜎𝐿
∗ < 𝜎𝐿𝐸2 the determinant is 
unambiguously positive, the point E2 is locally stable.  
 
3. Real exchange rate, technological progress and income distribution 
The standard BPCG model assumes that the growth rate of relative prices converges to zero 
over time, that is, 𝑒 + 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝𝑑 → 0. Given a rise in the rate of change of the nominal 
exchange rate (𝑒 + 𝑝𝑓 > 𝑝𝑑), the inflation rate will lag behind at an increasing rate of change 
over time until it matches the growth of foreign prices in terms of the domestic currency in 
the long-term (𝑒 + 𝑝𝑓 = 𝑝𝑑). As a result, long-term relative prices will cease to change and 
the level of the RER will be higher than its initial value. In other words, we are assuming here 
that a rise in the level of the nominal exchange rate only partially passes through into the 
domestic price level. In terms of the model developed here, any nominal exchange rate shock 
raises permanently the RER, Θ, until it stabilises at a higher level in the long-term.  
That said, now we must see how a currency devaluation impacts on both loci ?̇? = 0 and 
?̇?𝐿 = 0. As for the locus ?̇? = 0 described by Equation (16), we see that a currency 
devaluation shifts the curve upwards, since the intercept of Equation (16), 𝜌0, is positively 
related to Θ. That is, 𝑑𝜌0 𝑑Θ⁄ = 𝛼2𝜇(1 − 2Θ𝜇) > 0 for Θ𝜇 < 1/2. Figure 4 illustrates such a 
dynamic. The dashed-line representing the locus ?̇?0 = 0 is the initial curve whereas the solid 
line representing the locus ?̇?1 = 0 is the new curve following a currency depreciation.  
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As for the locus ?̇?𝐿 = 0 described in Equation (25), since the level of the RER is positively 
related to nothing but its intercept, a currency devaluation will shift the curve upwards 
 
 
 
 
without affecting its slope. More formally, from Equation (25) we have 𝑑𝑆 𝑑Θ⁄ =
𝜇 𝜔1(1 − 𝜆)𝛽2𝑧⁄ > 0. Figure 5 shows what happens with the locus ?̇?𝐿 = 0. 
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Once again, the grey dotted line ?̇?𝐿0 = 0 is the initial curve and the black one ?̇?𝐿1 = 0 is the 
new locus following a devaluation. Figure 6 shows the impact of an increase in Θ on the 
dynamics between technological progress and income distribution in the long-term.  
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Before we analyze the dynamics in Figure 6, we must determine how the wage and profit 
shares respond to changes in the RER.  
Assuming that firms set the price level according to a mark-up over prime costs, that is, 
unit labor cost and intermediate goods, , the price level is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑑 = 𝑇 (
𝑊
𝑎
+ 𝑃𝑓𝐸𝜇)                                                                                                                     (27) 
 
Equation (27) demonstrates an inverse relationship between the mark-up and the wage share.  
Following Blecker (1989), let us redefine the mark-up as a function of the RER. A 
devalued currency increases the monopoly power of domestic firms and enables them to raise 
their mark-up:  
𝑇 = 𝛿Θ                                                                                                                                              (28) 
where 𝛿 > 0 is a parameter. 
If we divide the mark-up price Equation (27) by domestic prices, substitute Equation (28) 
in the mark-up factor, and solve for 𝜎𝐿, then we obtain: 
1 = 𝛿Θ(𝜎𝐿 + Θ𝜇) ⇒ 𝜎𝐿 =
1
𝛿Θ
− Θ𝜇                                                                                          (29) 
𝑑𝜎𝐿
𝑑Θ
= −
1
𝛿Θ2
− 𝜇 < 0                                                                                                                   (30) 
 
 
 
 
The derivative, Equation (30), shows that a currency devaluation reduces the wage share. 
The same analysis can be extended for the profit share: 
1
𝛿Θ
= 𝜎𝐿 + Θ𝜇 ⇒ 𝜎𝐾 = 1 −
1
𝛿Θ
                                                                                                  (31) 
𝑑𝜎𝐾
𝑑Θ
=
1
𝛿Θ2
> 0                                                                                                                              (32) 
It can be seen in the derivative, Equation (32), that the profit share and the RER are positively 
related. Bearing these results in mind, we can now proceed to the analysis of Figure 6. 
Let us start with the LWS region around the unstable solution 𝐸1′. Perturbations in any 
other direction will be amplified, as the system veers off the new equilibrium point. 
Devaluation shifts the initial short-term solution to the left of 𝐸1, as devaluation reduces the 
wage share. Taking the scenario represented in Figure 6, if the initial short-term solution lies 
below (and to the left of) the separatrix crossing the new long-term equilibrium 𝐸1′, then 
devaluation reduces both 𝜎𝐿 and 𝑆, thus initiating a vicious circle. Since in the LWS region 
technological progress is wage-led, a decrease in the wage share also reduces the pace of 
technological innovation, which reduces growth, undermines the bargaining power of the 
workers, thereby bringing down once again the wage share and so on. In contrast, given the 
inverse relationship between the wage share and the RER in the LWS region, a currency 
appreciation seem to be the most recommended policy measure for a country to boost 
technological catch-up and reach a more equal income distribution. In the LWS region, a 
currency appreciation increases the wage share, which intensifies technological changes and 
propels growth; fast growth rates favor workers during the bargaining process, thus 
augmenting the wage share anew and so forth, generating a virtuous circle of technological 
progress, a reduction of income inequality and growth. 
 As for the analysis of the HWS region around the stable point 𝐸2′, it can be seen that 
devaluation shifts the equilibrium solution from 𝐸2 to 𝐸2′. Since in this region the 
technological progress is profit-led, devaluation accelerates the pace of technical change, due 
to an increase in the profit rate, and hence worsens income inequality as a consequence. 
Alternatively, a currency appreciation slows down the technological catching-up process and 
redistributes domestic income in favor of the workers. In short, perturbations in the stable 
solution induce 𝑆 and 𝜎𝐿 to move in opposite directions. This raises an important question: if 
we assume that the long-term growth of output is positively related to relative technological 
capabilities (𝑆) and the wage share (𝜎𝐿), as described in Equation (13), and given the fact 
 
 
 
 
that the RER is positively related to 𝑆 in the HWS region and negatively related to 𝜎𝐿, then 
what is the net impact of a devaluation on long-term growth? In the case of the LWS region, 
apart from the unlikely scenario where the system solution is moving along the separatrix, it 
is easy to see that if both 𝑆 and 𝜎𝐿 increase (decrease) simultaneously in a virtuous (vicious) 
circle, then the long-term growth rate must also increase (decrease). However, in the case of 
the HWS region, the impact of a currency devaluation on long-term growth is ambiguous. 
The next section seeks to shed some light on this issue. 
 
4. The net impact of currency devaluation on long-term growth 
In order to evaluate the net impact of devaluation on long-term growth, let us return to 
Equation (13). By substituting Equation (13) into Equation (10) we have extended Thirwall’s 
Law with endogenous elasticities as follows: 
𝑦𝐵𝑃 =
𝜀
𝜋
𝑧 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜎𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑆)𝑧                                                                                              (33) 
The assessment of an impact of a currency depreciation on long-term growth must consider 
not only how changes in the RER affect relative technological capabilities (𝑆) and the wage 
share (𝜎𝐿) but also the values of the parameters 𝛽0, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2.  
 That said, let us now illustrate in Figure 7 below the net impact of a currency devaluation 
on long-term growth in the HWS region. 
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In Figure 7, Equation (33) is represented in the first quadrant as a set of iso-growth curves, 
where each of which consists of a constant equilibrium growth rate in the space (𝜎𝐿, 𝑆). The 
slope of these curves is given by − 𝛽1 𝛽2⁄ . 
 As for the fourth quadrant, we must analyze the relationship between the RER and the 
equilibrium wage share in the HWS region (𝜎𝐿𝐸2). Figure 6 shows that a currency 
devaluation reduces the wage share (𝜎𝐿𝐸2′ − 𝜎𝐿𝐸2 < 0). Hence, the RER and the equilibrium 
wage share in the HWS region (𝜎𝐿𝐸2) are inversely related. In Figure 7 the relationship 
between the RER and 𝜎𝐿𝐸2 is assumed to be linear for convenience.  
 In the second quadrant we have the relationship between the RER and the country’s long-
term relative technological capabilities level in the HWS region. It follows from Figure 6 that 
 
 
 
 
a currency devaluation increases a country’s technological capabilities (𝑆𝐸2′ − 𝑆𝐸2 > 0). 
Thus, the RER and 𝑆𝐸2 are positively related. 
 Having defined the relations between the endogenous variables, we can now analyze the 
scenario represented in Figure 7. It starts in the third quadrant with a currency devaluation 
(Θ𝐸2′ − Θ𝐸2 > 0). In the fourth quadrant, we can see that the devaluation reduces the wage 
share in income (𝜎𝐿𝐸2′ − 𝜎𝐿𝐸2 < 0). On the other hand, the same devaluation increases the 
technological progress in the home country (𝑆𝐸2′ − 𝑆𝐸2 > 0), as shown in the second 
quadrant. Finally, in the first quadrant, since the iso-growth curves are sufficiently elastic—
that is, the slope of the iso-growth curves is sufficiently low in absolute value |𝛽1 𝛽2⁄ |—we 
can say that a currency devaluation spurs growth in the long-term (𝑦𝐵𝑃2 − 𝑦𝐵𝑃1 > 0). That 
is, the more gradual (steep) the iso-growth curve, the more (less) likely it is that a currency 
devaluation manages to spur growth. 
 To sum up, this model shows that the net effect of a currency devaluation on long-term 
growth is ambiguous which makes it an empirical issue. Nonetheless, our model contributes 
to the literature by mapping out conditions under which the net effect of a currency 
devaluation on economic growth is either positive or negative and hence sheds light on a 
number of testable hypotheses that could be explored in future empirical research. It depends 
not only on the parameters of the model, but also on the magnitude in absolute values of 
changes in its endogenous variables, namely the technology gap and the wage share, and on 
the type of technological progress regime, that is wage-led or profit-led. Therefore, 
policymakers should take into account the idiosyncrasies of the economy before they decide 
to promote economic recovery or simply boost growth by the use of currency devaluations. 
 
5. Concluding comments 
This paper contributes to the literature on BPCG models, income distribution and 
technological innovation by developing a theoretical framework in which the non-price 
competitiveness of the economy is determined by the coupled dynamics of relative 
technological capabilities and income inequality. An increase in the pace of technological 
innovation induces improvements in the non-price competitiveness of domestic goods. On the 
other hand, an increase in the wage share of income changes the consumption pattern of both 
capitalists and workers, and hence also affects the non-price competitiveness of the economy. 
Therefore, although the vast majority of existing studies indicate a positive relationship 
between the exchange rate and growth, in this analysis we point out a number of adverse 
 
 
 
 
effects of a currency devaluation on the structure of the economy that have been neglected in 
the literature to date, thus implying that the net impact of an exchange rate devaluation on 
growth is ambiguous. Our model establishes a set of conditions under which a currency 
devaluation can either boost or harm growth in the long-term. When the wage share is 
relatively low, given the constraints imposed on the parameters in this analysis, without loss 
of generality, a currency appreciation seems to be more effective to boost technical change, 
the wage share of income and economic growth. On the other hand, when the wage share is 
relatively high, a devaluation will cause technological innovation and the wage share to move 
in opposite directions, which means that the net impact of a real devaluation on long-term 
growth can go either way depending on the parameters of the model.  
Ergo, our theoretical model is particularly relevant in terms of exchange rate policies, as it 
sheds light on relevant features of the institutional framework (for example, trade unions and 
labor market regulation) and the structure of the economy (for example, different classes with 
different consumption patterns) which should not be neglected in policymaking. 
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Appendix  
 
The terms of the Jacobian matrix are: 
𝐽11 = −𝛼3 < 0 
𝐽12 = 𝜌1 − 2𝛼2 = 𝛼2(1 − Θ𝜇 − 2𝜎𝐿) = 2𝛼2(𝜎𝐿
∗ − 𝜎𝐿) ≷ 0 
𝐽21 = 𝜃𝛾2 > 0 
𝐽22 = −𝜃𝛾1 < 0 
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Figure 1. The locus ?̇? = 0  
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Figure 2. The locus ?̇?𝐿 = 0 
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Figure 3. The loci ?̇? = 0 and ?̇?𝐿 = 0 
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Figure 4. The impact of an undervaluation in locus ?̇? = 0 
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Figure 5. The impact of an undervaluation on locus ?̇?𝐿 = 0  
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Figure 6. The impact of a devaluation on the dynamics between 𝑆 and 𝜎𝐿 
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Figure 7. The impact of a currency devaluation on long-term growth 
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